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A FEMINIST CRITIQUE OF QUEBEC V. A.:
EVALUATING THE SUPREME COURT’S
DIVIDED OPINION ON SECTION 15 AND
COMMON LAW SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
Natasha Mukhtar*
This paper is a case comment of Quebec v. A. In Quebec v. A., the
Supreme Court of Canada tackled a Charter challenge to the Civil
Code of Quebec. The claimant, A., alleged that the legislation
violated her section 15 equality rights by discriminating on the basis
of marital status in excluding common law couples from spousal
support and division of property upon separation. The Court
delivered a lengthy, controversial, and divided decision with three
lines of dissent. Ultimately, the exclusion was upheld. Quebec
continued to exclude common law couples from the division of
property and remained the sole province to deny common law
couples spousal support upon separation. This paper uses feminist
theories of substantive equality to evaluate each of the four major
judicial opinions in Quebec v. A., highlighting the ways in which
women in common law relationships are more adversely affected by
exclusion from the support regime than men. It does so to argue that
striking down Quebec’s exclusion of common law couples from both
spousal support and the division of property, as per Abella J.’s
dissent, is more in keeping with feminist theories of substantive
equality.
This paper critiques the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision
and reasoning in Quebec (Attorney General) v. A. from a feminist
perspective. It does so by measuring the judicial opinions in Quebec
v. A. against the standard of feminist theories of substantive equality.
In Quebec v. A., the Court upheld the exclusion of unmarried
cohabitants from the Quebec legislative scheme on spousal support
and the division of property as justifiable discrimination on the
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ground of marital status under section 15(1) of the Charter.1 The
decision was controversial for its divided opinions and three lines of
dissent,2 its alleged reinvention of the discrimination analysis under
section 15(1),3 and the way it perpetuated disadvantaging women
more than men in common law relationships.
This paper is divided into two parts. The first section explains
which feminist theories of substantive equality are used as an
external standard in this paper and why. It then outlines the facts and
judicial history of Quebec v. A. The second section analyzes the
judicial opinions of Justices LeBel, McLachlin, Abella, and
Deschamps. It does so to demonstrate that Abella J.’s analysis and
decision under section 15(1) better responds to feminist theories of
substantive equality than that of her colleagues. Although the Court
in Quebec v. A. proceeded to a section 1 analysis, this paper focuses
on the Court’s analysis at section 15(1).
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She is grateful to Beverley Baines for her guidance and support in
supervising this project, and to the editors of the Canadian Journal of
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CONTEXT
FEMINIST THEORIES OF SUBSTANTIVE EQUALITY
USED IN THIS PAPER
Unlike formal equality—which grants equal rights and treatment
before the law—theories of substantive equality argue that equal
treatment does not always produce equal benefits or outcomes for
members of disadvantaged groups.4 Disadvantaged groups may be
defined as those who face systemic discrimination. Feminist
theorists such as Hester Lessard and Catharine MacKinnon argue
that formal equality may be insufficient to produce equal outcomes
for those of disadvantaged groups because it is characterized by a
fiction of equal access to benefits provided by neutral laws.5 In this
regard, formal equality assumes the sameness of experiences of
individuals when doing so may not be appropriate. Instead,
substantive equality demands a more contextualized approach to
equality. A contextualized approach is one which recognizes that
systemic inequalities faced by historically disadvantaged claimants
pose a barrier to equal access and protection.6 Substantive equality
requires analyzing the impact of equal treatment on claimants.
Vanessa Munro argues that the concept of formal equality is
flawed from a feminist perspective.7 It presumes that society is equal
4

Colleen Sheppard, “Equality, Ideology and Oppression: Women and the
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms” in Christine LM Boyle et al,
eds, Charterwatch: Reflections on Equality (Toronto: Carswell, 1986) at
196.

5

Judy Fudge, “The Public/Private Distinction: The Possibilities of and the
Limits to the Use of Charter Litigation to Further Feminist Struggles”
(1987) 25 Osgoode Hall LJ at 495.

6

Ibid at 496.

7

Vanessa Munro, Law and Politics at the Perimeter: Re-Evaluating Key
Debates in Feminist Theory (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2007) at 133.
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and thus, equal treatment by the law is sufficient to provide
individuals with equality in society.8 However, women may face
barriers in society such as economic disadvantage or the pressure to
conform to gender roles that prevent them from achieving equal
treatment and equal benefits from the law.9 In the context of Quebec
v. A., women may experience the impact of the exclusion of
unmarried cohabitants from the support regime differently than men.
This is because women constitute a group of historically
disadvantaged claimants;10 the barriers women face in society affect
the ways in which they are impacted by neutral laws.
This paper uses feminist theories of substantive equality to
evaluate the Court’s reasoning in Quebec v. A. It does so because,
since its first decision on section 15(1) equality rights in Andrews v.
Law Society of British Columbia, the Supreme Court itself has
emphasized a substantive approach to equality.11 This approach
rejects mere sameness of treatment or formal equality in exchange
for an effects-based analysis.12 Though the Court did not explicitly
use the term “substantive equality” in Andrews, it described the
approach as such in subsequent section 15(1) cases such as Withler
v. Canada (Attorney General).13 The Charter explicitly references a
goal of providing “equal benefit of the law” under section 15(1).14
This reflects feminist theories of substantive equality in their
8

Ibid at 133.

9

Ibid at 133.

10

Supra note 6 at 532.

11

Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143.

12

Kathleen E Mahoney, “The Constitutional Law Of Equality in Canada”
(1992) 44 Me L Rev 229 at 244.

13

2011 SCC 12 at para 2, [2011] 1 SCR 396.

14

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, s 15, Part I of the Constitution
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11.
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emphasis on equal outcomes rather than treatment. For these
reasons, feminist theories of substantive equality are used in this
paper to measure the extent to which the Court’s decision and
reasoning in Quebec v. A. meet that goal.
FACTS OF QUEBEC V. A.
B was a 32-year-old businessman who began a relationship with A
when she was 17. Their relationship lasted ten years, over which
time they had three children. A was the primary caregiver to their
children. Over the course of their relationship, B became a
billionaire and icon in the Quebec business community. 15 Though A
wanted to get married, B refused stating that he did not believe in the
institution of marriage.16 After separating, A demanded spousal
support and division of property.
JUDICIAL HISTORY OF QUEBEC V. A.
A brought a claim against B and the Attorney General of Quebec
using section 15(1) of the Charter. A argued that provisions of the
Civil Code of Quebec made a discriminatory distinction based on the
analogous ground of marital status by distinguishing between
unmarried and married cohabitants. She claimed that it did so by
excluding unmarried cohabitants from its spousal support and
property regime.
At the Superior Court, Hallée J. held that the impugned
provisions did not violate A’s equality rights under section 15(1).17
15

Shantona Chaudhury & Nicolas M Rouleau, “When Equality, Autonomy
and Politics Collide: Unpacking Eric v. Lola” (2013) 32 Advocates’ Soc J
No 2 at 3.

16

Ibid.

17

Droit de la famille – 091768, 2009 QCCS 3210, [2009] JQ no 7153.
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Hallée J. discussed the purpose of the section 15(1) provisions,18
deciding that the provisions excluded common law couples from the
regime in order to protect their choice.19 She held that common law
couples make a choice to remain outside the regime by not getting
married.20 She found that this was the purpose behind the provisions’
distinction between married and unmarried cohabitants.21 Hallée J.
cited Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v. Walsh22 as precedent for
considering choice as part of a legislative purpose at section 15(1) in
cases of support claims between spouses.23 Walsh was a previous
section 15(1) case on post-separation division of property between
unmarried cohabitants. In Walsh, the Court similarly declined to
include unmarried cohabitants in the support regime by citing their
choice to remain outside it by not getting married.24
At the Quebec Court of Appeal, Dutil J.A. allowed A’s appeal in
part.25 She struck down the spousal support provisions, but held that
the property provisions did not infringe section 15(1).26 At section
15, Dutil J.A. divided her analysis of the spousal support and
property provisions.27 She decided that the different objectives
18

Ibid at para 264.

19

Ibid at para 222.

20

Ibid at para 243.

21

Ibid at para 276.

22

Nova Scotia (Attorney General) v Walsh, 2002 SCC 83, [2002] 4 SCR 325
[Walsh].

23

Supra note 18 at para 249.

24

Walsh, supra note 18.

25

Droit de la famille – 102866, 2010 QCCA 1978 at para 3, 89 RFL (6th) 1.

26

Ibid at para 164.

27

Ibid at para 67–68.
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behind them, in protecting against economic vulnerabilities and
decisions to accumulate property respectively, necessitated separate
analyses.28 She found that the spousal support provisions violated
section 15(1) by perpetuating both prejudice and stereotypes against
common law couples. Dutil J.A. limited Walsh’s applicability in
Quebec v. A. to the analysis of the property provisions for two
reasons. 29 First, in contrast to A’s claim for both property and
support, Walsh dealt with only the division of property.30 Second,
Walsh was decided under a jurisdiction in which common law
couples were already eligible for spousal support upon separation.
Thus, common law couples in that jurisdiction were less vulnerable
than those completely excluded from both spousal support and
property, such as A and B.31
In the decade prior to Quebec v. A., only three claimants
successfully argued section 15(1) claims at the Supreme Court.32 Of
the section 15 cases decided by the Court, it is unclear how many
qualify as a victory for women’s equality. However, two cases
brought by male claimants were successful in arguing sex equality
claims.33 Lahey argues that when the Court awards women victories

28

Ibid.

29

Ibid at 64.

30

Ibid.

31

Ibid at 66.

32

Karen Busby, “Discussed, Reformulated and Enriched Many Times: The
Supreme Court of Canada’s Equality Jurisprudence” (Paper delivered at the
Canadian Bar Association Annual National Constitutional and Human
Rights Conference, Ottawa, June 2014), [unpublished].

33

Ibid.
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in equality claims, it does so using an “empty” concept of equality.34
By empty equality, Lahey means one lacking a substantive approach
or the recognition of men and women’s varied experiences.35 She
argues that this represents a contradiction between the Court’s goal
of substantive equality and its actual application of a more restricted
notion of equality in section 15 cases.36 Prior to Quebec v. A.,
equality rights cases also involved a continual reinvention of the
section 15(1) test. This ranged from a focus on discrimination in
Andrews,37 to human dignity and a more formalized analysis of
contextual factors in Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and
Immigration),38 to the use of prejudice and stereotyping as rigid
categories of discrimination in R v. Kapp39 and Withler.40 Thus,
Quebec v. A. held the potential to explain the current form of the
section 15(1) test, the reasons for the lack of success of section 15
claimants (especially women), and the link between the two.

34

Kathleen A Lahey, “Feminist Theories of (In)Equality” in Sheilah L Martin
& Kathleen A Mahoney, eds, Equality and Judicial Neutrality (Toronto:
Carswell, 1987) 71 at 82.

35

Ibid at 82.

36

Ibid at 82.

37

Andrews v Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 SCR 143 at paras 33–
39.

38

Law v Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [1999] 1 SCR
497 at paras 47–88, 170 DLR (4th) 1.

39

2008 SCC 41 at paras 18–25, [2008] 2 SCR 483.

40

Withler v Canada (Attorney General), 2011 SCC 12 at paras 30–40, [2011]
1 SCR 396.
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ANALYSIS OF THE SUPREME COURT’S HOLDINGS AT
SECTION 15(1) IN QUEBEC V. A.
At the Supreme Court, B and the Attorney General appealed the
lower court’s suspension of the spousal support provisions. A
appealed the lower court’s decision of finding the property
provisions valid. A 5:4 majority, including Abella J., Deschamps J.
and McLachlin C.J. found a violation of section 15. In effect, the
justices divided on gender lines with the women, plus Cromwell J.,
finding discrimination and proceeding to the section 1 analysis.
LeBel J., representing the men, minus Cromwell J., wrote the dissent
at section 15 which declined to find a violation. At section 1, the
section 15 majority separated. McLachlin C.J. provided the swing
vote to uphold the provisions at section 1. Below, this paper applies
the standard of feminist theories of substantive equality to evaluate
the Court’s reasoning.
LEBEL J.’S DECISION
In dissent at section 15, LeBel J. refused to find an infringement. He
found that the provisions did not perpetuate prejudice or
stereotyping.41 LeBel J. defined the test for discrimination at section
15(1) as “the imposition of a disadvantage that is unfair or
objectionable, which is most often the case if the disadvantage
perpetuates prejudice or stereotypes.”42 Thus, he left open the
possibility of finding disadvantage using other indicia. LeBel J. also
recognized that prejudice may be inadvertent and unintentional.43
Though LeBel J. seemed to define the section 15(1) test as
flexible and thus favourable to claimants, he applied a more rigid
41

Quebec (Attorney General) v A, 2013 SCC 5 at para 281.

42

Ibid at para 180.

43

Ibid at para 251.
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test. He used only prejudice and stereotyping as indicators of
disadvantage and considered choice in his discrimination analysis at
section 15(1). Similar to the Superior Court, LeBel J. cited the
purpose of the provision as protecting the choice of common law
couples to remain outside the regime by choosing not to marry.44 By
considering choice, LeBel J. brought a justificatory analysis of the
provisions’ purpose into section 15. By doing so, he shifted the
burden to the claimant to prove the discriminatory nature of the
legislative purpose. This would otherwise be the burden of the Court
at section 1. In contrast, the majority at section 15 considered choice
only at section 1.
Critique of LeBel J.’s Reasoning
LeBel J.’s section 15 analysis is lacking from the perspective of
feminist theories of substantive equality because he seemed to apply
only a formal notion of equality. In his analysis, he emphasized
individualism, autonomy, non-intervention of the state into social
relations, and choice. Sheppard notes that such notions correspond
with a formal conception of equality.45 This is because such notions
stem from liberal theories of equality in which formal equality is
rooted.46
In his analysis, LeBel J. also assumed the sameness of men’s
and women’s experiences of the exclusion. In this sense, his analysis
corresponds with formal notions of equality because he did not
consider how the exclusion may impact men and women differently.
As Eberts notes, the standard of sameness is not always

44

Ibid at paras 214–251.

45

Supra note 5 at 196–97.

46

Ibid.
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appropriate,47 such a type of formal equality—she argues—is
inappropriate because it tends to accept the male experience as the
norm.48 This norm becomes the experience that is expected or
assumed of individuals. This may not be the case if women’s and
men’s experiences are not the same. Assuming the male experience
as the norm, formal equality also tends to benefit only those women
who conform to or are capable of conforming to it.49 MacKinnon
explains that, in this way, supposedly neutral laws sometimes benefit
only those women who conform to the expected standard.50 Neutral
laws, in this sense, disregard the disadvantages and systemic barriers
that prevent women from benefiting from such laws51
LeBel J. assumed the sameness of men’s and women’s
experiences of exclusion in his discussion of alternatives to inclusion
in the support regime. He held that common law couples already
have access to remedies outside of the support regime, such as
constructive trusts and cohabitation agreements, which can be used
to protect their interests at separation, assuming that men and
women in common law relationships have equal access to such
remedies. However, this may not be the case if one partner is more
economically vulnerable than the other and faces barriers to such
remedies. Further, such remedies can be used to exploit a financially
vulnerable partner. For example, the terms of a cohabitation
agreement may be used as a bargaining chip against the cohabitant
47

Mary Eberts, “Sex and Equality Rights” in Anne F Bayeksky & Mary
Eberts, eds, Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms (Toronto: Carswell, 1985) 183 at 221.

48

Ibid at 218.

49

Ibid.

50

Catharine A MacKinnon, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and
Law (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1987) at 37.

51

Ibid.
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on matters of custody, access, and child support. Women in such
relationships are more likely to be financially dependent.52 They
may fail to conform to standards of financial independence due to
systemic barriers associated more with women’s experiences than
those of men. Those women who are unable to conform to the norm
of financial independence may thus experience access to alternative
remedies differently than men. Exclusion from the regime may have
the effect of leaving men and women with different degrees of
access to the only remedies available to unmarried cohabitants.
Further, LeBel J. presumes sameness of experience in his
discussion of choice. He recognized that choice may not be
deliberate if parties are unaware of the legal consequences of their
status.53 In such cases, parties may not consciously choose to remain
outside the regime, but may simply be unaware of their exclusion.
LeBel J. refused to give judicial notice to such reasoning, stating that
such facts remain in dispute.54 However, as Chaudhury and Rouleau
note, according to a 2013 poll, 62% of Quebecers believe unmarried
cohabitants are entitled to a division of property upon separation.55
Further, 58% of Quebecers are unaware that unmarried cohabitants
are not entitled to spousal support upon separation.56 These statistics
are striking considering Quebec has more common law couples than
any other province, but offers the least post-separation support. As
Bakht notes, Quebec remains the only province in the country to
52

Anne Barlow & Rebecca Probert, “Regulating Marriage and Cohabitation:
Changing Family Values and Policies in Europe and North America—An
Introductory Critique” (2004) 26 Law & Pol’y 1 at 6. See also Catharine A
MacKinnon, Sex Equality, 3d ed (USA: Foundation Press, 2016) at 658–
686.

53

Supra note 2 para 274.

54

Supra note 2 at page 12.

55

Chaudhury and Rouleau supra note 16 at 8.

56

Ibid.

A Feminist Critique of Quebec v. A.

141

exclude common law couples from spousal support regimes.57 Thus,
though LeBel J. intended to give deference to the choice of common
law couples to remain outside the regime, he may instead be giving
deference to their ignorance.
From the perspective of feminist theories of substantive equality,
LeBel J.’s consideration of choice at section 15 is problematic for
three reasons. First, LeBel J. considered choice when A’s financial
vulnerability constrained her ability to make decisions and exercise
choice. In effect, LeBel J. considered A’s supposed choice when she
lacked the ability to choose to get married. A, like other spouses in
similar situations, was economically vulnerable to B, who worked as
the sole provider for the family and refused to get married. As
Abella J. notes, choice for spouses in A’s situation may be illusory
due to the power imbalance created by their spouse’s economic
superiority.58 By protecting choice in such scenarios, the Court may,
in effect, be protecting only the choice of the economically superior
spouse (here B) who refuses to get married. By doing so, the Court
implicitly endorses and reinforces the economically superior
spouse’s power in the relationship. Munro notes that the law, in this
way, can play a part in constructing gender norms.59 Here, the law
seems to construct and further cement gender norms of a man’s
superiority in the relationship by excluding A from the support
regime and thus leaving her unprotected and financially dependent
on B.
The way in which LeBel J. assumed that both men and women
are equally able to exercise choice in common law relationships
57

Natasha Bakht, “A v B and Attorney General of Quebec (Eric v Lola): The
Implications for Cohabiting Couples Outside Quebec” (2012) 28 Can J
Fam L 261.

58

Supra note 2 at para 216.

59

Munro, supra note 8 at 44.
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reflects the sameness approach of formal equality. As Mahoney
notes, those using the sameness approach compare women claimants
of discrimination to men, even though women’s choices may be
more constrained.60 When women are compared to men under this
approach, “their opportunity to be treated as equal is limited to the
extent that they are the same as men.”61 LeBel J. presumed that A
and B, and men and women in common law relationships more
generally, have equal abilities to exercise choice. As Sheppard notes,
treating men and women equally in this way helps only those
women who are able to emulate and conform to men’s experiences.62
In effect, A suffered because she was unable to exercise choice as
effectively as men who do not face the same barriers as women in
common law relationships. As Sheppard notes, women in this way
are blamed for their inability to achieve the male experience of
choice and autonomy.63
LeBel J.’s analysis can be criticized even if it is accepted that
choice was not illusory for A. This is because it can be said that, in
denying her claim, he still effectively punished A for her choice to
remain outside the regime. Thus, A suffered even if it is accepted
that she was able to exercise choice. As Young notes, choice is
sometimes used to hold individuals responsible for their outcomes.64
As she states, “when one makes the ‘wrong’ choice, one seemingly
has no right.”65 In contrast, B benefited from his choice to remain
outside marriage as he did not have to provide A with spousal
60

Mahoney, supra note 13 at 244.

61

Ibid at 249.

62

Sheppard, supra note 5 at 212.

63

Ibid at 213.

64

Margot Young, “Social Justice and the Charter: Comparison and Choice”
(2013) 50 Osgoode Hall LJ 669 at 14.

65

Ibid.
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support or property. In these ways, LeBel J.’s use of choice was
problematic from feminist perspectives of substantive equality for
failing to recognize women’s experiences of increased barriers to
choice and autonomy than men.
Second, LeBel J.’s consideration of choice is problematic for the
way in which he used it to deny that the exclusion perpetuated
stereotyping. LeBel J. defined stereotyping as basing a law on traits
that do not relate to an individual’s “actual circumstances…needs,
capacities, or merits.”66 He found that the exclusion responds to the
actual circumstances of common law couples. He considered their
actual circumstances as ones of choosing to remain outside the
regime. However, it may be argued that LeBel J.’s analysis itself
rested on stereotypes. This is because he presumed that A made a
choice to remain unprotected by the regime. This is stereotypical if it
was not her actual circumstance. It may thus be argued that LeBel J.
stereotyped A and other common law spouses by considering choice
to be their essential identifying feature. As an essential identifying
feature, choice was generalized as a trait found in and available to all
common law spouses. Watson Hamilton and Koshan note that
identifying features are sometimes essentialized in this way. They
note that stereotyping is a way of generalizing such essential
identifying features.67 LeBel J. generalized the choice of common
law couples by presuming that all cohabitants deliberately chose to
remain outside the regime by not getting married. The way in which
LeBel J. stereotyped choice as the essential identifying feature of
common law claimants had the effect of eclipsing their actual
circumstances. These circumstances may be that they are unable to
exercise choice. Feminist theories of substantive equality would
require considering these circumstances, especially in the context
that women may face more barriers than men in exercising choice.
66

Supra note 2 at para 201.

67

Koshan and Hamilton, supra note 4 at 5.
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Instead, LeBel J. applied a more formal notion of equality which
lacked the contextual analysis required by a substantive approach.
In these ways, LeBel J.’s discussion of choice incorporated
notions of formal equality into his analysis. It may be argued,
however, that LeBel J.’s consideration of choice is preferred from a
feminist perspective. This is because his emphasis on choice respects
women’s autonomy to choose. Protecting autonomy and choice may
be preferred in the context of, for example, rights to one’s body.
However, such reasoning is problematic in the context of debating
inclusion in support regimes. This is because women`s choices to
enter the regime, as explained above, may be constrained or illusory,
more so than that of their male counterparts.
LeBel J.’s analysis of choice demonstrates the friction between
Charter principles of autonomy, linked here with choice, and
protecting the vulnerable.68 Such friction may be evident in the
relative success of section 7 claims compared to the lack of success
of equality claims under the Charter.69 This is because section 7
claims may be associated more with autonomy, whereas section 15
is often associated with protecting the vulnerable (such as those
vulnerable to discrimination). The principle of autonomy is
associated with the Court’s recent conception of the equality rights
claimant as a self-interested neoliberal citizen resistant to
government intervention in individual choices.70 Such a conception
alienates those such as A, who may be burdened twice, first by
lacking autonomy and thus being unable to make choices, and again,
by being left unprotected by the Charter and family legislation.
LeBel J. refused to find a violation of section 15 in order to protect
68

Busby, supra note 34.

69

Jena McGill, “Developments in Constitutional Law: The 2013 Term”
(2015) 68 SCLR (2nd) at 137.

70

Busby, supra note 34.
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the choice and autonomy of individuals to remain outside the
regime. However, it may be argued that LeBel J.’s emphasis on
choice, though tied to autonomy, failed to protect A’s individuality
or autonomy. This is because by being excluded from the protective
regime, A was left dependent on B’s financial decisions.
The friction between the principles of autonomy and the
protection of vulnerability reflects the clash between the different
conceptions of equality motivating the Charter, in particular, formal
and substantive equality.71 LeBel J.’s analysis, which incorporates
notions of choice, autonomy and individualism, reflects notions of
formal equality underlying the Charter. However, his analysis falls
short in incorporating the Charter’s goals of substantive equality.
From a feminist perspective, his analysis is lacking for his
consideration of sameness and choice, associated here with formal
equality. Instead, substantive equality requires a contextual analysis
considering the different impacts of the exclusion on men and
women in order to protect those more vulnerable to adverse effects.
ABELLA J.’S DECISION
Justice Abella held that the provisions infringed section 15 and were
not justifiable under section 1. In contrast to LeBel J., justice Abella
found a violation of section 15 without engaging in an analysis of
prejudice and stereotyping. Instead, she found the provisions
violated section 15 by perpetuating disadvantage. The disadvantage,
in this case, was the exclusion of common law couples from the
regime.
Critique of Abella J.’s Reasoning
This paper argues that Abella J.’s analysis is preferred from the
perspective of feminist theories of substantive equality. This is
71

Sheppard, supra note 5 at 203.
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because Abella J., in contrast to LeBel J., moved past a standard of
formal equality. Instead, she applied a substantive approach
responsive to the feminist perspectives used as the standard in this
paper. She did so in two ways. First, Abella J.’s formation of the
section 15(1) test broadened it in a way which permitted a more
contextualized analysis of discrimination. Second, in applying the
test, Abella J. examined the different impacts of the provisions on
men and women.
Abella J.’s formulation of the test for discrimination at section
15 differed from more rigid versions of the test applied in past
section 15 cases. Abella J. declared that prejudice and stereotyping
were neither necessary nor “discrete elements” for finding
discrimination under section 15.72 In doing so, Abella J. rendered
consistent previous applications of the section 15(1) test in Kapp and
Withler which appeared to require a prejudice and stereotyping
analysis. She stated that the indicia of prejudice and stereotyping ask
whether discriminatory attitudes exist. She stated that the focus
should instead be on whether there is discriminatory impact on
claimants, regardless of whether it is “unconsciously motivated.”73
This eases the burden on claimants by refocusing on their actual
situation rather than requiring them to bring evidence that the
provision promotes negative attitudes.74 Abella J.’s definition of
discrimination was in line with McIntyre J.’s original definition in
Andrews. In Andrews, McIntyre J. defined discrimination as
“distinctions…which involve,” and thus may not be limited to
“prejudice or disadvantage.”75 It may be argued that, in framing the
test this way, Abella J.’s strayed from prior section 15 cases.
However, Abella J. herself, along with McLachlin C.J., stated in
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Kapp that discrimination could be found through a perpetuation of
“disadvantage or prejudice.”76 In moving past a rigid analysis of
prejudice and stereotyping to a more general analysis of
disadvantage, Abella J. continued a trend towards a more liberal
section 15 test evident since Kapp and Withler’s abandonment of
comparator group analysis and rigid application of the Law factors.
Abella J.’s formulation of the section 15(1) test for
discrimination is preferred from the perspective of feminist theories
of substantive equality for two reasons. First, it produced a test more
conducive to protecting substantive equality. Mahoney notes that an
analysis of disadvantage “is determined contextually by examining
the group in the entire social, political, and legal fabric of our
society.”77 This mirrors the contextual analysis associated with
substantive equality.78 Applied to Quebec v. A., the test of
disadvantage forced the Court to consider systemic disadvantages
against women in common law relationships. Such considerations
help motivate a finding that neutral legislation which assumes the
sameness of men and women’s experiences of exclusion from the
regime may in fact be more disadvantageous to women. Considering
disadvantage, in this way, places the emphasis of the analysis on
equality of outcomes, rather than merely equality of opportunity. 79
This may be more difficult if using only the indicia of prejudice and
stereotyping which focus less on outcomes and more on the
impugned provision itself.
Second, Abella J.’s formulation of the section 15(1) test for
discrimination is preferred from the perspective of feminist theories
of substantive equality because she refused to consider choice. In
76
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doing so, Abella J. mirrored L’Heureux-Dubé J.’s dissent in Walsh.80
Abella J. justified leaving choice out of the section 15 analysis by
pointing to the recognition of marital status in Miron v. Trudel as an
analogous ground.81 By recognizing marital status as an analogous
ground, the Court in Miron identified its immutable nature. In doing
so, it recognized that an individual may appear free to choose to
marry, but their options may be limited by, for example, financial
constraints or other factors out of their control.82 In the case at hand,
such factors may include B’s rejection of the institution of marriage.
Considering the choice to marry would disentitle claimants from the
very protection afforded by the recognition of marital status as an
analogous ground.83 Abella J. stated that although the Court
considered choice at section 15 in Walsh, the test evolved since then
significantly enough that Walsh no longer be followed. Abella J.’s
refusal to consider choice corresponds with the feminist theories
cited in this paper. This is because, in doing so, Abella J. recognized
that women may face greater barriers to exercising choice than men
due to their experiences of systemic discrimination. In this sense, her
analysis differed from LeBel J.’s sameness approach because she
recognized that women excluded from the regime may be impacted
differently than men.
In addition to her formulation of the test, Abella J.’s application
of it is preferred from the perspective of feminist theories of
substantive equality for two reasons. First, in her analysis, Abella J.
considered women’s experiences of dependence and vulnerability in
common law relationships. As Lessard notes, women`s experiences
of dependence are often ignored in legal analysis since they are
80
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considered “legally irrelevant.”84 Lessard argues that notions of
equality which ignore such private experiences fail to adequately
protect the disadvantaged.85 Abella J. recognized the need to
consider these experiences when evaluating the impact of their
exclusion from the regime. Lessard notes that equality cases in
which private experiences are devalued are characterized by a public
/ private distinction.86 Abella J. moved past such a public / private
split by examining women’s private experiences of vulnerability and
dependence and using these as justifications in her legal analysis for
striking down the exclusion.
Second, Abella J.’s analysis is preferred because she analyzed
common law relationships for their content or substance.87 Abella J.
found that common law couples are functionally similar to married
couples by, for example, being equally economically integrated.
This is akin to the Court’s analysis in cases on the rights of same-sex
marriage claimants to inclusion in support regimes offered to
heterosexual married couples. For example, in M v. H, the Court
found that the exclusion of same-sex couples from aspects of the
Ontario family support regime affecting unmarried cohabitants
violated section 15.88 Same-sex couples were analyzed as
substantively similar to other common law couples who were
included in some parts of the Ontario support regime. Same-sex
couples were thus included in the protective regimes. In the same
vein, Abella J. emphasized the functional similarity of married and
84
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unmarried cohabitants in deciding that they should be included in the
regime. Further, Abella J. stated that the regime was formed to
protect not the form of marriage, but the needs that arise from
mutual obligations.89 She explained that married and unmarried
cohabitants experience similar degrees of dependence in the
relationship. As McLellan notes, support legislation is meant to
protect people in a position of dependency.90 Thus, as she notes,
excluding unmarried cohabitants may be an arbitrary exclusion
without regard for actual dependency in such relationships.91 In
effect, Abella J. considered the circumstances and context of
common law couples, which she analogized to that of married
couples. Her contextual analysis thus incorporated considerations of
the feminist perspectives used in this paper.
In her analysis, Abella J. characterized the disadvantaged spouse
in common law relationships as an economically vulnerable woman.
This is in opposition to LeBel J.’s characterization of such claimants
as autonomous individuals with the freedom to choose to remain
outside the support regime. It may be argued that Abella J.’s
characterization stereotypes or victimizes women in such
relationships as “forever vulnerable and forever in need of
protection.”92 However, Abella J.’s analysis was necessarily
gendered (by analyzing the exclusion’s negative impact on women
more than men). Such an analysis was necessary due to the gendered
nature of the problem itself in which women more often than men
are in a situation of economic dependence or vulnerability in
common law relationships. As Majury notes, a gender-neutral
solution, or one which ignores the different effects of the exclusion
89
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on men and women, is not always appropriate for a gendered
problem.93 Since Abella J. recognized that financial and social
dependence in such relationships is a gendered problem because
women often make up the class of economically vulnerable
unmarried cohabitants, this justified her gendered analysis of
associating women in such relationships with a lack of choice and
autonomy. In contrast, in his analysis, LeBel J. disassociated A from
her social and economic situation of lacking choice and autonomy in
relation to B. As Munro notes, it is necessary to consider the
individual in context, without “stripping them of the characteristics
and relationships that influence their choices.”94 By considering the
context of the claims, Abella J. analyzed not only the exclusion
made by the provisions, but who benefitted by the exclusion and,
critically, at the expense of whom. From her discussion, it appeared
that the economically superior spouse, B, benefitted to the detriment
of the economically vulnerable A. For these reasons, Abella J.’s
analysis incorporated considerations of the exclusion’s impact on
women. She adopted a contextual approach aware of women’s
experiences of disadvantage. In doing so, Abella J.’s analysis was
more responsive to feminist theories of substantive equality than that
of LeBel J.
DESCHAMPS J.’S DECISION
Justice Deschamps agreed with Justices Abella and McLachlin in
finding an infringement at section 15. However, she differed by
upholding only the property provisions under section 1. At section
15, Deschamps J. used the flexible test of disadvantage applied by
justice Abella. She also incorporated a contextual analysis similar to
Abella J. by considering A’s claims in the context of systemic
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barriers to women in common law relationships which place them at
a greater disadvantage than men when excluded from the support
regime.
Critique of Deschamps J.’s Reasoning
When measured against the standard of feminist theories of
substantive equality, Deschamps J.’s analysis is preferred over
LeBel J.’s analysis for her use of a more flexible section 15(1) test
and her consideration of the different impacts of the exclusion on
men and women. However, Deschamps J.’s analysis is not preferred
over justice Abella’s. This is because of the way in which
Deschamps J. separated her analysis of the spousal support and
property provisions and decided to strike down only the former.
Deschamps J. differentiated between spousal support and the
division of property. She found that spouses become economically
dependent over time without having consent or control in the matter.
She stated that this lack of consent or control necessitated the
inclusion of unmarried cohabitants in the spousal support regime. 95
In contrast, she found that the accumulation of property can be
characterized as a “conscious act” in which parties exercise a greater
degree of consent.96
From the feminist perspectives used in this paper, Deschamps
J.’s decision to uphold the property provisions and strike down the
spousal support provisions is inconsistent. Deschamps J. applied a
contextual analysis to striking down spousal support. She did so by
emphasizing the need to protect economically vulnerable common
law women excluded from the support regime. Yet, she deviated
from this reasoning in upholding the property provisions. It can be
95
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argued that, in the context of her analysis on the property provisions,
Deschamps J. gave more weight to notions of formal equality such
as autonomy and choice than notions of substantive equality. This is
because she assumed the autonomy and choice of individuals in
accumulating property. This is contrast to her discussion of the
spousal support provisions in which she recognized that autonomy
or choice may be illusory. It may be argued that the “conscious act”
and greater degree of consent she correlated with property
accumulation are also illusory. It may be argued that the exclusion
from property is characterized by the same lack of consent that she
recognized in considering the spousal support provisions. This
suggests that including unmarried cohabitants in the regime may be
needed to account for the actual lack of consent and control faced by
women in both scenarios. In this sense, analyzing such factors only
in relation to the exclusion from spousal support, instead of
considering such factors in the analysis of both spousal support and
property, may be inconsistent. For these reasons, standards used in
this paper may require that, in contrast to Deschamps J.’s reasoning,
the exclusion from spousal support and property both be struck
down.
MCLACHLIN C.J.’S DECISION
Chief justice McLachlin departed from the majority on section 15 by
upholding the provisions under section 1. At section 15, McLachlin
C.J. mirrored LeBel J. in indicating that factors other than prejudice
and stereotyping, such as disadvantage alone, could be used in
finding discrimination. She did so by describing prejudice and
stereotyping as “useful” but seemingly unnecessary “guides.”97
However, McLachlin C.J. proceeded to apply prejudice and
stereotyping in her analysis and found that the provisions
perpetuated both. As Bala and Leckey note, it may be disconcerting
that McLachlin C.J. found both stereotyping and disadvantage and
97
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thus recognized the severity of the discrimination, but nonetheless
upheld the provisions at section 1.98 McLachlin C.J. also deviated
from her colleagues by incorporating an analysis of the reasonable
person at section 15. In doing so, she asked whether the impugned
provisions were discriminatory from the point of view of the
reasonable person.99
Critique of McLachlin C.J.’s Reasoning
Measured against the theories used in this paper, McLachlin C.J.’s
analysis is not preferred due to the way in which she applied the
section 15(1) discrimination test from the point of view of the
reasonable person. It is not preferred for the two reasons outlined
below.
First, as Moran notes, the reasonable person test is criticised
from a feminist perspective for having a tendency to frame the
reasonable person as the reasonable man.100 The standard thus results
in comparing women claimants to a reasonable man who may not be
subject to the same systemic discrimination faced by women. The
reasonable person test, in this way, has the potential to presume a
level playing field or sameness of experiences among men and
women. This is problematic because a section 15 claimant may
require a more contextual analysis that takes into account their
history of disadvantage which prevents them from being at a level
playing field. The reasonable person test may be tied to formal
98
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equality because it assumes sameness without considering barriers to
sameness. The test of the reasonable person, then, may run counter
to conceptions of substantive equality which criticize a sameness
analysis.
Second, the reasonable person test runs the risk of implicitly
framing the reasonable person as a neoliberal individual with greater
autonomy and choice than is the reality for some economically
vulnerable spouses. This is problematic because the reasonable
person, as an individual with greater choice and autonomy, may not
be impacted by the impugned provisions the same way as those with
less choice and independence. McLachlin C.J. stated that she applied
the test of a reasonable person “possessed of similar attributes to,
and under similar circumstances as, the claimant.”101 This suggests
that she recognized the need for a more contextual analysis of the
circumstances of claimants, such as women’s systemic
disadvantages which constrain their ability to exercise choice and
autonomy in common law relationships. However, comparing the
claimant to a reasonable person still imposes another barrier to
establishing a violation of equality rights which is still inappropriate
even if a contextualized version of the reasonable person is
considered.
The concept of the reasonable person is misplaced in the section
15 analysis and equality cases in general. The equality rights
claimant may not be on the same footing as the average reasonable
person. In this sense, the use of the standard of the reasonable person
is problematic regardless of whether or not the claimant is a man.
Section 15 claimants are often not similarly situated to the average
person in a social, cultural, socio-economic or other sense. In
assuming sameness, the reasonable person test may fail to consider
systemic discrimination that prevents individuals from being on
equal footing. For these reasons, McLachlin C.J.’s use of the
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reasonable person in her section 15 analysis is inappropriate and
problematic when measured against feminist perspectives of
substantive equality, which require such a consideration of systemic
discrimination.
CONCLUSION
When measured against the standards used in this paper, LeBel J.’s
analysis is undesirable because of the way in which his
considerations of sameness and choice are tied to formal equality.
Deschamps J.’s analysis is objectionable because her analysis of the
spousal support and property provisions is inconsistent from a
feminist perspective. McLachlin C.J.’s analysis is not preferred
because of the way in which she incorporated the test of the
reasonable person into section 15. Abella J. most effectively
incorporated a consideration of the ways in which women in
common law relationships may be more disadvantaged by the
exclusion from the support regime than men. Her analysis reflects
the contextual analysis associated with the standard used in this
paper. In keeping with feminist theories of substantive equality,
Abella J. moved past sameness to consider what prevents individuals
from being treated the same in society and by the law.

